Horng Tech Entr Co v. Sakar Intl Inc by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-23-2011 
Horng Tech Entr Co v. Sakar Intl Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Horng Tech Entr Co v. Sakar Intl Inc" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1033. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1033 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3648 
_____________ 
 
HORNG TECHNICAL ENTERPRISE CO., LTD. 
 
v. 
 
SAKAR INTERNATIONAL, INC.; 
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive 
 
      Sakar International, Inc., 
 
                              Appellant. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 06-cv-00816) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2011 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  June 23, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Sakar International, Inc. (“Sakar”), appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey enforcing the settlement agreement between Sakar 
and Horng Technical Enterprise Co., LTD. (“Horng”) on June 4, 2010 (the “Settlement 
Agreement”).  Sakar argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the Settlement 
Agreement was enforceable even though a contractually-required signatory failed to sign 
within the prescribed 30-day period.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. Background 
Sakar, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, 
is an importer and wholesaler of computer accessories.  Horng, a Taiwanese corporation 
with its principal place of business in Taiwan, was a manufacturer of computer 
accessories.   
In 2004, Horng delivered over $900,000 worth of computer accessories to Sakar in 
California and Michigan.  In 2005, Horng sued Sakar in California state court over 
Sakar‟s alleged failure to pay for those accessories.  The suit was subsequently removed 
to federal court and transferred to the District of New Jersey.  Sometime thereafter, 
Horng was officially dissolved as a result of its failure to timely elect a Board of 
Directors.  A Taiwanese liquidator, Mr. Chang Wen-Fong (the “Liquidator”), who was 
authorized to pursue litigation and other claims on behalf of Horng, continued the 
litigation.  On June 2, 2010, the parties proceeded to trial, and on June 4, 2010, the third 
day of trial, the case settled and was dismissed with prejudice.     
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The handwritten Settlement Agreement, which was read into the record prior to 
the order of dismissal, provided that Sakar would pay $250,000 to the trust account of 
Horng‟s counsel in exchange for dismissal of the case and a release of liability.  The 
Settlement Agreement also provided that the Liquidator must, within 30 days of June 4, 
2010, sign the Settlement Agreement and mutual release and that the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey would retain jurisdiction to enforce the 
Settlement Agreement.
1
   
 Thereafter, the parties struggled to agree on a more formal memorialization of the 
Settlement Agreement and the procedures related to its signing.  On June 29, 2010, after 
multiple exchanges, Horng sent to Sakar a revised memorialization of the Settlement 
Agreement reflecting the multiple demands made by Sakar.  Horng indicated that the 
Liquidator would sign the settlement documents and requested that Sakar also sign.  On 
June 30, 2010, Sakar responded with two additional demands and indicated that it would 
seek redress from the Court if Horng refused to accede to those demands.  On July 8, 
2010, Horng forwarded a further revised memorialization of the Settlement Agreement to 
Sakar reflecting Sakar‟s latest demands and again requested that Sakar sign the 
documents.   
The next day, July 9, 2010, Sakar responded that the Liquidator had failed to sign 
within the 30-day period and so had failed to comply with the Settlement Agreement.  In 
                                              
1
 Because of the Fourth of July holiday, the parties appear to have considered 
July 6, 2010, as the end of that 30-day period.   
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response, Horng filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement.  On August 11, 
2010, while litigation continued, the Liquidator signed the settlement documents.  
 After receiving the parties‟ positions in writing, the District Court held a 
teleconference with them.  Sakar argued that the 30-day provision was a “time is of the 
essence” clause and that, by not having the Liquidator‟s signature by July 6, 2010, Horng 
had breached the Settlement Agreement and excused Sakar from performing.  The 
District Court disagreed, concluding that the 30-day provision was not a “time is of the 
essence” clause and that some of the delay was attributable to Sakar imposing multiple 
conditions “which were neither explicitly or implicitly included in the agreement which 
was reached before the Court.”  (App. at 12.)  Accordingly, the Court ordered Sakar to 
honor the Settlement Agreement and pay the $250,000 within 15 days. 
 Sakar timely appealed.   
II. Discussion2 
Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction generally apply the substantive law 
of the state in which they sit.  Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Under New Jersey law, the “„validity of a contract is to be determined by the law 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Contract interpretation, i.e., determining the 
meaning of contract terms, entails resolving questions of fact, and we review those 
factual findings for clear error.  John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 
657, 659 (3d Cir. 1986).  In contrast, contract construction, i.e., determining the legal 
operation of a contract, entails resolving questions of law, and our review of those 
questions is plenary.  Id.   
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of the place of contract,‟” Cal. Natural, Inc. v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 465, 
470 n.3 (D.N.J. 1986) (quoting Colozzi v. Bevko, 110 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1955)), which, in 
this instance, is New Jersey.  New Jersey law provides that, “if parties agree on essential 
terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they have created an 
enforceable contract.”  Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. 1992).  
That is so even if the initial writing is considered informal and is expected to be followed 
by “the execution of a more formal document.”  Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, 
Inc., 346 A.2d 419, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
Here, the Settlement Agreement calls for payment of a definite sum in exchange 
for a release from liability.  Those terms are the essence of the settlement, and each party 
manifested an intent to be bound by those terms by signing the Settlement Agreement.  
The Settlement Agreement, then, was an enforceable contract, notwithstanding the 
parties‟ desire to execute a more formal document after the fact.    
Furthermore, the District Court did not err in determining that the Settlement 
Agreement required Sakar‟s performance, notwithstanding the Liquidator‟s having failed 
to sign within 30 days.  The Court‟s factual findings support two alternative bases for 
affirmance.  First, given the duration of the litigation and lack of explicit “time is of the 
essence” language in the Settlement Agreement, it was not error to find that time was not 
of the essence with respect to the Liquidator‟s signature.  The Liquidator‟s failure to sign 
within the specified period was thus not a material breach that would excuse Sakar from 
performing.  See 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 43:7 (4th ed. 2011) (observing that, 
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“where there is no indication in the contract or finding that time is of the essence, a 
failure to perform the contract on the exact date specified is not deemed such a breach as 
will justify nonperformance by the other party”); cf. Linan-Faye Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Hous. Auth. of City of Camden, 995 F. Supp. 520, 523 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that 
conditioning performance on timely payment does not make time of the essence such that 
a delinquent payment will constitute a material breach excusing the other party‟s 
nonperformance).   
Second, given Sakar‟s several additional demands during the 30-day period, it was 
not error to find that Sakar had, at least in part, contributed to the untimeliness of the 
Liquidator‟s signature.  Considering the Liquidator‟s signature as a condition precedent 
to Sakar‟s performance, Sakar would not be excused from performing, since it 
contributed to the failure of the condition.  See 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 46:14 
(4th ed. 2011) (observing that a condition precedent to a party‟s performance is waived 
where that party “contributes to the delay [of the other party‟s timely performance]”); cf. 
Allstate Redevelopment Corp. v. Summit Assocs., Inc., 502 A.2d 1137, 1141 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1985) (noting that, where a party “has acted in bad faith, that party will not 
escape liability on a contract even though the other party has failed to satisfy a condition 
precedent”).     
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.   
